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THE BOARD OF PRISON TERMS AND
PAROLES: CRITERIA IN DECISION MAKING
George W. Johnson*
The functions of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles' are to set
minimum terms of prison confinement for convicted persons2 and to
grant3 or revoke 4 parole. In the past, parole and sentencing boards
have been criticized for alleged arbitrariness in making decisions 5
because prisoners in like circumstances have not always been treated
alike. The Washington Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is trying to
overcome this image and establish objective guidelines upon which it
can rely in making its decisions.
I. SENTENCING
The following is a summary of the mechanics of the Board's opera-
tion in the sentencing process, after which the policies underlying its
decision-making process will be examined. The State of Washington
has a modified indeterminate sentence structure. The maximum term
for each felony is limited by statute and, if the arrestee is convicted,
the court must impose a maximum term within the statutory guide-
lines.6 The minimum term is generally fixed by the Board. Neither the
* Member, Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, May, 197 to
present; B.S., 1953, Prairie View A & M College; B.A., 1960, Central State University;
M.A., 1975, Pacific Lutheran University. The author's views are not intended to repre-
sent those of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles.
1. The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles is a relatively small, independent agen-
cy composed of seven members and a staff of twenty-five. The Board members are
appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate and serve staggered terms
of five years each. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.95.001-.003 (1974).
2. Id. § 9.95.040, .052. See also id. § 9.95.080 which empowers the Board to re-
voke its previous order determining the length of imprisonment where the convicted
person has commited an infraction of the rules and regulations of his place of incar-
ceration. See notes 17-24 and accompanying text infra describing crimes for which
the Board cannot set a minimum term.
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.110, .115 (1974).
4. Id. 99 9.95.120-.125.
5. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 90-96
(1971).
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.010 (1974). The statute excepts certain crimes such as
treason, murder in the first degree, and carnal knowledge of a child under ten years
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court-imposed maximum nor the Board-determined minimum ac-
tually indicates the length of time necessarily spent in prison, however,
because Washington has a good time law7 which grants credit for up
to one-third8 the Board-determined minimum sentence for good be-
havior. The time spent in prison may be even further reduced if the
Board lowers the minimum sentence after finding that the person is
rehabilitated and fit for release. 9 This conditional release prior to ex-
piration of the court-imposed maximum sentence is termed parole.
The Board's procedure for determining minimum terms is clear.
The Board must fix a minimum term within six months after the ad-
mission of a convicted person to a state correctional institution' o or
within thirty days of that person's return to prison as a parole viola-
tor.' Whenever a person is convicted and sentenced to prison, the
prosecuting attorney and sentencing judge must furnish a statement to
the Board of all the facts concerning the convicted person's crime and
any other relevant information they possess.12 They must also suggest
the duration of imprisonment they deem appropriate.' 3 The Board
will not schedule a minimum term meeting with the convicted person
until it has received the proper court papers, the aforementioned rec-
ommendations, and a social history of the person prepared by the
Department of Social and Health Services. After receipt of the proper
documents the Board must thoroughly inform itself as to the facts of
the convicted person's crime and also as to his or her personality. '4
from the court's maximum sentencing responsibility. In enacting the new criminal
code, id. tit. 9A (Supp. 1975) (effective July 1, 1976), and a new rape statute. id. ch.
9.79 (Supp. 1975), the legislature failed, however, to relate the sentencing statute to
the new substantive criminal law changes. The crimes excepted from court authority
carried mandatory sentences under the old criminal code, but only murder in the
first degree (life imprisonment. id. § 9A.32.040) and aggravated murder in the first de-
gree (death, id. § 9A.32.046) carry mandatory penalties under the new criminal code.
But see Gregg v. Georgia, 44 U.S.L.W. 5230 (U.S. July 2. 1976). Carnal knowledge
of a child under the age of ten years is subsumed under the defintions of rape and
statutory rape contained in id. ch. 9.79 and the penalties therein prescribed. Treason.
as defined in id. ch. 9.82 (1974), carries a death penalty. but the death penalty as
imposed under that statute was declared unconstitutional in State v. Vidal. 82 Wn. 2d
74, 508 P.2d 158 (1973), citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. WAsH. REV. CODE § 9.95.070 (1974).
8. Id. § 9.95.110.
9. Id. § 9.95.052.
10. Id. § 9.95.040.
11. Id. § 9.95.125.
12. Id. §§ 9.95.030-.032.
13. Id. § 9.95.030.
14. Id. § 9.95.170 provides that:
To assist it in fixing the duration of a convicted person's term of confinement.
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Two members of the Board then meet with the convicted person
and determine the minimum term. If the two members disagree, the
decision is made by a majority vote of all seven members. 15 Although
no interested parties (including family members, friends, relatives, at-
torneys, and advocates) may be present at this determination, both
advocates and adversaries may submit written correspondence for
consideration. Because minimum term fixing is not an extension of
sentencing, 16 there is no constitutional right to representation by
counsel at the meeting.
The Board recognizes that certain mandatory minimum terms are
required by law. For example, if there is a finding of fact by the court
that a person was armed with a deadly weapon while committing the
crime, the Board must fix a mandatory minimum term of five years
for the first felony conviction and seven and one-half years for a
second felony conviction. 17 The Board may waive mandatory min-
imum terms, however, by a vote of four of the seven members, except
for the offenses of first and second degree murder.' 8 As another exam-
ple, persons convicted of first degree rape must now serve a manda-
tory three-year term that cannot be reduced by the Board.' 9
The Board does not set the minimum term in a life conviction for
first degree murder. 20 The prisoner may, however, be paroled after
having been continuously confined for a period of twenty years, less
prescribing treatment for such person while in confinement and supervising and
regulating his or her activities while on parole, it shall not only be the duty of
the board of prison terms and paroles to thoroughly inform itself as to the facts
of such convicted person's crime but also to inform itself as thoroughly as possible
as to such convict as a personality....
(emphasis added).
15. Id. § 9.95.007.
16. The setting of the minimum term, i.e., the date of parole availability, is within
the exclusive discretion of the parole board. January v. Porter, 75 Wn. 2d 768, 453
P.2d 876 (1969).
17. WASH. REV. CODE §8 9.95.015, .040(l)-(2) (1974). If an individual is con-
victed of being a habitual criminal or of embezzling funds from an institution of
public deposit, mandatory minimum terms are also required by statute. Id. §§
9.95.040(3) & (4).
18. Id. § 9.95.040. See Baker v. Morris, 84 Wn. 2d 804, 529 P.2d 1091 (1974),
in which the court invalidated a Board rule that required a vote of at least six mem-
bers to waive an inmate's mandatory minimum term on the ground that the Board
had exceeded its rulemaking authority to the extent that the rule modified and
amended the precise statutory requirements of WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.040 (1974).
84 Wn. 2d at 809, 529 P.2d at 1094.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.170 (Supp. 1975).
20. Id. § 9A.32.040. This provision is part of the new criminal code effective July
1, 1976.
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earned good time, if the penitentiary superintendent certifies that his
conduct and work have been meritorious and recommends that he be
paroled. 21 Therefore, any person sentenced for first degree murder
may be paroled as soon as thirteen years and four months after his or
her original incarceration. In contrast, a person convicted of aggra-
vated murder in the first degree2 2 who is imprisoned instead of
executed23 will never be paroled or released from prison. 24
The Board is well aware that the alleged arbitrariness of sentencing
and its decision-making process have been severely criticized.25 It has
seemed to some that not all persons in similar circumstances have
been treated alike. It must be realized, however, that even experts are
often unable to agree on solutions to common sentencing problems.
For example, in 1975 the King County Prosecutor's Office co-hosted
a conference entitled The Criminal and Society: Should We Treat or
Punish? Nationally-recognized experts26 in law and the behavioral sci-
ences, as well as officials from all over the state, participated, yet no
concrete answers to common sentencing problems were formulated.
Nevertheless, some steps can be taken to ameliorate the sentencing
problem. The establishment of an explicit policy for sentencing deci-
sion-making would increase the Board's ability to ensure that con-
victed persons are dealt with in similar ways in similar situations.
With this goal in mind, the Board is developing a compilation of its
21. Id. § 9.95.115 (1974).
22. Id. § 9A.32.045 (Supp. 1975). This provision is also part of the new criminal
code and is a result of the passage of Initiative 316. Although laws enacted through
the initiative process ordinarily take effect thirty days after the election, Initiative 316.
by its own terms, is an amendment to the new criminal code and will not take effect
until July 1. [1976] WASH. ATrT'y GEN. OP. 4. Aggravated murder in the first degree
is defined by statute to include, inter alia, instances in which the victim was a police
officer or fire fighter, the murderer was serving time in a state correctional institution.
the murder was for hire, or the murder was committed in the course of rape or kid-
napping. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.045 (Supp. 1975). But see Gregg v. Georgia. 44
U.S.L.W. 5230 (U.S. July 2, 1976).
23. The punishment for aggravated murder is a mandatory death sentence. WASH.
REv. CODE § 9A.32.046 (Supp. 1975). If the Governor commutes the death sentence
or the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional, the penalty is life imprisonment
without parole or release. Id. § 9A.32.047.
24. Id. § 9A.32.047.
25. See note 5 supra.
26. Participants in the conference included: Marvin Wolfgang, Professor of Soci-
ology and Law, University of Pennsylvania; Norval Morris, Dean of the Law School.
University of Chicago; Robert Martinson. Chairman, Dep't of Sociology, City College
of the City University of New York; John Conrad. Director of the Program for Social
Justice, Academy for Contemporary Problems; Clarence Schrag, Professor of Soci-
ology, University of Washington; Duncan Chappel, Division of Law and Justice. Bat-
telle Memorial Institute; Milton Rector, President, Nat'l Council on Crime and De-
linquency.
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past experience in minimum sentencing for both initial terms and
terms resulting from parole violations. Using this data,27 the Board
will develop an explicit policy28 concerning minimum term fixing. A
decision-making matrix will be constructed with one axis reflecting the
severity of the offense and the other axis reflecting risk to the public.
The Board's discretion will not be removed, but will be structured in a
way that can enhance equity and equality of treatment, facilitate the
giving of reasons, and expose decision policy to public debate and
criticism. At the same time, it should substantially reduce the uncer-
tainty felt by prisoners under the modified indeterminate sentence
system.
II. PAROLE
Granting and revoking parole is another major function of the
Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. When a person has completed his
minimum sentence, less time for good behavior, he becomes eligible
for parole,2 9 which will be allowed if the Board deems it advisable.
The determination whether a person poses a risk to society is of grave
concern and requires careful consideration. In this time of high crime
rates and rising numbers of prison sentences our purpose remains
clear: to protect society, to release under parole supervision only those
persons who will remain at liberty without violating the law, and to
return to custody those persons who violate parole conditions. This
approach to the disposition of offenders is supported by two funda-
mental concepts. First, the law favors the liberty of the individual. 30
Second, when government has a variety of equally effective means
27. See Appendix infra for a portion of the data compiled.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.150 (1974) gives the board authority to "make all
necessary rules and regulations" pertaining to its responsibilities.
29. Id. § 9.95.110.
30. As early as State ex rel. Syverson v. Foster, 84 Wash. 58, 146 P. 169 (1915),
a habeas corpus case, the Washington Supreme Court stated that the right of personal
liberty was a strictly natural right preserved by the law of the commonwealth. That
the law favors the liberty of the individual also may be discerned from the Washington
Constitution. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (due process); § 4 (right of petition and assem-
bly); § 5 (freedom of speech); § 7 (prohibition on invasion of home or private af-
fairs); § 9 (rights of the accused); § 11 (religious freedom); § 13 (habeas corpus);
§ 15 (effect of convictions); § 17 (imprisonment for debts prohibited); § 20 (avail-
ability of bail); § 21 (trial by jury); § 22 (rights of the accused); § 23 (bills of at-
tainer, ex post facto laws prohibited).
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available to achieve a given end, it must choose the one which inter-
feres least with individual liberty. 31
The responsibility of deciding whether to parole or deny parole is
not taken lightly by the Board. An error in judgment may endanger
the public and may jeopardize the criminal justice system, especially
parole. On the other hand, to deny parole may extinguish a person's
hopes, destroy his or her family, and embitter the person to the extent
that he or she will more likely be a greater threat when finally re-
leased. A proper decision is predicated on a fair sentence, accurate
diagnosis and classification, modern prisons, adequate treatment, and
professional supervision of the parolee. The quality of the Board's
decisions cannot rise above the quality of these components.
The Board is in the process of developing an explicit policy re-
garding parole. It has adopted the goals of the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which stated
that "the major task of the Parole Board is articulation of criteria for
making decisions and development of basic policies. This task is to be
separated from the specific function of deciding individual parole
grant and revocation cases .... "32
Five different points of view have been identified3 3 that are com-
monly considered by parole boards in making their decisions. These
views are those of the jurist, sanctioner, evaluator, citizen, and regu-
lator. The Board attempts to balance each of these views when
making a decision regarding a parolee. The jurist is sensitive to the
concepts of due process and impartiality, rules of evidence, and the
protection of individual rights. The sanctioner disapproves of certain
types of behavior, whether performed in society, in the institution, or
on parole, by imposing penalties. The evaluator balances factors indi-
cating societal risk with an individual's potential success in each par-
ticular case and determines his or her risk and rehabilitation potential.
The citizen's view is reflected in the concern for maintenance of com-
munity harmony and preservation of social order. It considers the citi-
zenry's desires and expectations regarding the handling of convicted
31. See, e.g., Comment, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE
L.J. 464 (1969); Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1245 (2d Cir. 1972) (Oakes.
J., concurring).
32. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS. REPORT ON THE
TASK FORCE ON CORRECTIONS: SUMMARY REPORT ON CORRECTIONS 417 (1973).
33. V. O'Leary & J. Hall, Frames of Reference in Parole (unpublished. undated
pamphlet of the Nat'l Parole Institute, Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinquency. Hack-
ensack, N.J.; on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review).
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persons. The regulator is sensitive to the effect of the Board's deci-
sions on the parole system and its participants, especially prisoners
and parolees.
The Board must decide and, when appropriate, reconsider the dis-
position of each offender based upon factual evidence, individual
evaluation, public interest, and prevailing social values in a setting
that reflects fair play and due process. In evaluating a person's readi-
ness for release on parole, the Board considers several factors. The
most significant of these are the threat the individual may pose to the
public, the individual's degree of rehabilitation, his attitudes, and the
willingness of the community to accept him back into society. These
factors are determined in part by examination of the individual's prior
criminal record and his response to the correctional programs. Evi-
dence of increased personal stability and responsibility is favorable.
Additionally, family ties, satisfactory living arrangements, the ability
to form positive personal relationships, and employability are viewed
as indicators of continued stability after release. Many personal defi-
ciencies apparent at admissions are overcome during incarceration.
Educational or vocational achievement and progress made through
the staff counseling and therapy are aspects to be considered. In the
end, the Board must agree that the person's rehabilitation is complete
and that he or she is a fit subject for release.
It is important that the Board continuously evaluate the effects of
its decisions on the personal safety and property of the public. Board
members are aware of the difficulty in predicting who will be dan-
gerous to society. This difficulty is, of course, increased when a person
has never previously been convicted of a dangerous act. No one can
accurately predict dangerous behavior in an individual with no history
of violent activities. Therefore, the Board deals in probabilities in the
important decisions relative to future behavior. The author is well
aware that the general public is not as concerned with probabilities as
it is with possibilities. Neither is the public concerned about statistics
which may reveal that a murderer is a better parole risk and is least
likely to re-offend than a burglar or auto thief, or that violence is
more likely to be unleashed by a relative, close friend or acquaintance
than by a total stranger.34 The Board does its best, however, to bal-
ance and accommodate the concerns of the individual and society.
34. For a statistical survey of Washington's corrections process, see Comment, A
Perspective on Adult Corrections in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 495 (1976).
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III. CONCLUSION
The criminal justice system is not perfect, and, in this author's opin-
ion, never will be so long as human beings make judgmental decisions
affecting other human beings. The irrationality and unpredictability
of some crimes make them difficult to understand and nearly impos-
sible to guard against. These inherent problems are aggravated by the
fact that the system is overcrowded, overworked, undermanned, un-
derfinanced, and frequently misunderstood. 35 To improve the system,
more knowledge, resources, vision, and public support are needed.
Most of all, people must be willing to examine and re-examine the
system and attempt to undertake reform in light of public input.
The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles works within the criminal
justice system by exercising its discretion in fixing sentences and
dealing with parole offenders. It seeks to give the offender the oppor-
tunity to utilize the correctional experience for his or her benefit and
to secure the public from those who threaten it with violent or unde-
sirable behavior. In this manner it attempts to implement the major
objectives of the criminal justice system: crime control and protection
of the public.
35. The Board of Prison Terms and Paroles' daily population report of March 9.
1976 (on file at the offices of the Washington Law Review) indicates that four of
Washington's seven adult correctional institutions house populations above their
stated capacities. The Board has been asked to consider early parole of certain cate-
gories of persons in order to alleviate overcrowded conditions, pending action by the
state legislature on a request made to the Department of Social and Health Services
for more funds, facilities, and staff. Interviews with Mr. Milton Burdman. Deputy
Secretary, Dep't of Social and Health Services and Mr. Harold B. Bradley. Director.
Adult Corrections, in Olympia, Washington, Feb. 27, 1976.
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APPENDIX
Minimum Terms Fixed, RCW Offenses
1975 Fiscal Year
From To Average
Offense Number
Years Months Years Months Years Months
Murder, Second Degree 37 3 0 50 0 15 0
Manslaughter 21 1 0 10 0 5 3
Robbery 146 0 6 20 0 5 9
Assault, First Degree 13 5 0 25 0 12 0
Assault, Second Degree 82 1 0 27 6 6 1
Burglary, First Degree 7 3 0 20 0 6 9
Burglary, Second Degree 243 0 9 30 0 3 1
Grand Larceny 235 0 9 15 0 3 1
Auto Theft 59 0 6 10 0 2 9
Forgery 83 0 9 15 0 3 2
Rape 24 1 6 25 0 9 3
Carnal Knowledge 11 1 0 10 0 3 6
Indecent Exposure 25 2 6 20 0 9 4
Sodomy 8 2 6 11 0 7 2
Drug Offenses 224 0 3 10 0 2 5
Felony, in possession 4 2 6 6 0 4 0
of firearm
Escape 9 0 9 7 6 4 1
Arson, First Degree 4 3 6 20 0 7 11
Arson, Second Degree 9 1 6 7 6 3 11
Kidnapping 4 2 6 20 0 9 2
Accessory After Fact 7 1 0 5 0 2 4
Riot 4 2 0 4 0 2 6
Non-supportt -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Othert 5 1 6 4 0 2 6
All Court Commitments 1,267 0 3 50 0 4 10
All Returns From Parole 216 0 1 20 0 2 11
TOTAL 1,483 0 1 50 0 4 1
t No one was sentenced for non-support in Washington in 1975.
t Crimes included under the title "Other" are accepting the earnings of a prostitute, fraudulent
issue of securities, and sabotage.
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